

DECLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

E22
J...

PAGE 01 STATE 327030
ORIGIN OES-09

INFO LOG-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 INR-10 NEA-06 L-03 INRE-00
ACDA-12 SNP-01 /042 R

DRAFTED BY: OES/NEC:E MURDY:MW
APPROVED BY: OES/NEC:C THORNE
ACDA/NWC:E WARD
NEA/RA:S AOKI
INR/SFA/NS:J SNOWDEN

OES/NEP:J DETHOMAS
S/NP:G SAMORE
L/OES:J SCHWARTZ

-----222042 210000Z /63

P 202319Z OCT 87
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY

[REDACTED] STATE 327030

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: ENRG, KNNP, PK
SUBJECT: SPECTROPHOTOMETER FOR PAKISTAN

REF: ISLAMABAD 20385

1. [REDACTED] (ENTIRE TEXT).

2. DEPARTMENT APPRECIATES LEARNING OF PENDING PURCHASE OF AN AUSTRALIAN SPECTROPHOTOMETER FOR PAKISTAN COUNCIL OF SCIENTIFIC AND INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH (PCSIR).

3. ACCORDING TO USG TECHNICAL EXPERTS, THE SUBJECT SPECTROPHOTOMETER IS A MULTIPLE-USE ITEM OF RELATIVE TECHNICAL INSIGNIFICANCE BUT ONE THAT COULD BE USEFUL IN NUCLEAR FUEL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. ALTHOUGH THE INTENDED END-USE IN COAL RESEARCH IS APPROPRIATE, SOME CONCERNS HAVE BEEN VOICED ABOUT POSSIBLE DIVERSION OF THIS EQUIPMENT TO AN UNSAFEGUARDED NUCLEAR RESEARCH FACILITY. WHEREAS THE TECHNICAL CONTRIBUTION OF SUCH A [REDACTED]

PAGE 02 STATE 327030

DIVERSION WOULD BE MINIMAL, IT WOULD CLEARLY BE CONTRARY TO OUR POLICY OF NO NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH PAKISTAN.

4. THEREFORE, DEPARTMENT DOES NOT OBJECT TO THE PENDING PURCHASE CONDITIONAL UPON RECEIVING POST-INSTALLATION

VERIFICATION THAT THE SUBJECT SPECTROPHOTOMETER IS IN PLACE AT PCSIR FUEL RESEARCH CENTER. THIS CONDITION WOULD BE REQUIRED IF THIS COMMODITY PURCHASE WERE BEING

9601820
0281096

Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Graffeld, Dir. A
Release () Basic () Deny () Declassify
Date 9/28/97 Exemption

UNCLASSIFIED

PROCESSED THROUGH NORMAL USG EXPORT CONTROL PROCEDURES.

UNCLASSIFIED

5. DEPARTMENT WOULD APPRECIATE AN ANALYSIS OF PCSIR'S SCOPE OF ACTIVITIES AND AN ASSESSMENT OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PCSIR AND GOP TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE FOLLOWING:

(A) AN END-USE DOCUMENT PURPORTEDLY ISSUED BY PCSIR WAS INCLUDED IN THE MATERIALS SUBMITTED TO U.S. AUTHORITIES BY ARSHAD PERVEZ IN HIS EFFORT TO EXPORT MARAGING STEEL TO PAKISTAN.

(B) PCSIR DIRECTOR IS DR. NAEEM AHMAD KHAN, BROTHER OF PAKISTAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION CHAIRMAN MUNIR KHAN.

(C) PCSIR DIRECTOR DR. NAEEM AHMAD KHAN WAS, UNTIL THREE YEARS AGO, DIRECTOR OF THE PAKISTAN INSTITUTE OF NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY. ARMACOST

NNNN

*** Current Handling Restrictions *** n/a
*** Current Classification ***

UNCLASSIFIED

EX. CO. 2618
RECEIVED
THE WHITE HOUSE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON

67 DEC 22 PM 12:34

HA

604927
T3193

December 17, 1987

P.D. 4
88-4

Dear Mr. Speaker:

I am writing you with respect to Section 620E(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, which requires an annual certification concerning Pakistan to permit assistance to be furnished and military equipment or technology to be sold or transferred to that country during the fiscal year. I made this certification for FY 1986 on November 25, 1985 and for FY 1987 on October 27, 1986.


Information on the status of Pakistan's nuclear program is provided to Congress in the annual classified report pursuant to Section 735 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981. In addition, the Administration has fulfilled its legal obligation to keep the appropriate committees of Congress fully and currently informed of activities in Pakistan which are of significance from the proliferation standpoint. In this regard, information bearing on my certification will be offered to the Congress.

I have made my best judgment based on the information available to the United States Government, taken as a whole. I have also taken into account the fact that the statutory standard as legislated by Congress is whether Pakistan possesses a nuclear explosive device, not whether Pakistan is attempting to develop or has developed various relevant capacities. Based on the evidence available, and on the statutory standard, I have concluded that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device.

The proposed United States assistance program for Pakistan remains extremely important in reducing the risk that Pakistan will develop and ultimately possess such a device. I am convinced that our security relationship and assistance program are the most effective means available to us for dissuading Pakistan from acquiring nuclear explosive devices. Our assistance program is designed to help Pakistan address its

substantial and legitimate security needs, thereby both reducing incentives and creating disincentives for Pakistani acquisition of nuclear explosives. Pakistan is clearly aware of the inevitable cessation of our security assistance program should it acquire a nuclear explosive device. Thus, I believe the proposed United States assistance program will reduce significantly the risk that Pakistan will possess a nuclear explosive device.

A copy of my certification pursuant to Section 620E(e) is enclosed.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Ronald Reagan". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned to the right of the main text block.

Enclosure:
Presidential Certification

The Honorable Jim Wright
Speaker of the House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20510

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 17, 1987


Presidential Determination
No. 88-4

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State

SUBJECT: Determination Pursuant to Section 620E(e) of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as Amended

Pursuant to Section 620 E(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, 22 U.S.C. 2375(e), I hereby certify that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear explosive device and that the proposed United States assistance program will reduce significantly the risk that Pakistan will possess a nuclear explosive device.

You or your delegatee are authorized and directed to publish this determination and certification in the Federal Register.

Handwritten signature of Ronald Reagan in cursive script.

UNCLASSIFIED E35 P

PAGE 01 LAHORE 02434 250844Z
ACTION NEA-11

INFO LOG-00 COPY-01 ADS-00 INR-10 SS-00 CIAE-00 EB-00
DODE-00 NSCE-00 NSAE-00 PM-10 INRE-00 SP-02 C-01
E-01 P-02 T-01 /039 W
-----266436 250908Z /22

P 250839Z AUG 87
FM AMCONSUL LAHORE
TO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC 9323
AMCONSUL KARACHI
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR

9601820
Dept. of State, RPS/IPS, Margaret P. Grafeld, D.
() Release (X) Excise () Deny (X) Declassify
Date 10/1/98 Exemption B1

LAHORE 02434

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, PREL, US, PK
SUBJECT: PERVEZ NUCLEAR ARREST CASE - POSSIBLE LOCATION
- OF BRIG. INAM UL HAQ

1. ENTIRE TEXT)

2. (STRICTLY PROTECT),
A FEDERAL CIVIL SERVANT PRESENTLY SERVING THE GOVERNMENT
TOLD ACTING CG
ON AUGUST 25 THAT BRIG. INAM UL HAQ IS PRESENTLY AT A
GOVERNMENT REST HOUSE IN AZAD KASHMIR, SURROUNDED BY
POLICE. HE WOULD NOT DISCLOSE HIS SOURCE OF INFORMATION
ABOUT THE ALLEGED WHEREABOUTS OF UL HAQ, THE PAKISTANI
PURCHASER OF THE STEEL THAT ARSHAD PERVEZ HAD ATTEMPTED
TO EXPORT FROM THE U.S.

3. DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THE CORDON AROUND UL HAQ
WAS FOR HIS PROTECTION OR DETENTION. HE PROMISED TO
PROVIDE MORE INFORMATION AS IT BECAME AVAILABLE. IF TRUE,
HAVING UL HAQ IN AZAD KASHMIR, A TECHNICALLY INDEPENDENT
COUNTRY, PRESENTS INTERESTING POSSIBILITIES. HE WOULD BE

PAGE 02 LAHORE 02434 250844Z

BEYOND THE BOUNDS OF GOP COURT AND POLICE JURISDICTION,
BUT HE COULD NOT LEAVE, EXCEPT THROUGH PAKISTAN.

4. COMMENT: [] A RELIABLE, CAUTIOUS []
BUREAUCRAT OF INTEGRITY. HE MEASURES HIS WORDS CAREFULLY.
HE CAME TO THE CONSULATE GENERAL TO DISCUSS A VISA CASE
AND ONLY DISCLOSED THE ABOVE AFTER SOME PRODDING. WE
CANNOT VERIFY HIS INFORMATION, BUT THOUGHT IT WORTH
REPORTING. STEWART

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

PARM. Non-proliferation

FOOO? 7

SECRET/NOFORN/ORCON

6/23/83

EXCISE

THE PAKISTANI NUCLEAR PROGRAM

INTRODUCTION/SUMMARY

There is unambiguous evidence that Pakistan is actively pursuing a nuclear weapons development program. Pakistan's near-term goal evidently is to have a nuclear test capability, enabling it to explode a nuclear device if Zia decides its appropriate for diplomatic and domestic political gains. Pakistan's long-term goal is to establish a nuclear deterrent to aggression by India, which remains Pakistan's greatest security concern.

The Government of Pakistan is pursuing both the reprocessing and uranium enrichment routes to obtain fissile material for their program. They are building a facility near PINSTECH capable of extracting small quantities of plutonium from KANUPP power reactor fuel. In addition, they are continuing to seek assistance from supplier countries to complete the larger reprocessing facility located at Chasma. We have no reason to believe, however, that Pakistan has yet produced the fissile material necessary for a nuclear explosive device or a nuclear weapon.

To produce sufficient quantities of plutonium for a test device for weapons Zia probably would have to abrogate or violate Pakistan's nuclear safeguards with Canada and the International Atomic Energy Agency. Pakistan is attempting to produce highly enriched uranium, which could support a test or weapons program without involving any safeguards agreements.

PAKISTAN'S FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES

Pakistan's major fuel cycle facilities include the Canadian-supplied, CANDU-type power reactor located on the coast near Karachi.

A uranium ore concentration plant and UF6 production plant are located Dera Ghazi Khan near deposits of uranium.

-- The ore concentration plant is in operation, processing Pakistani ore.

-- The UF6 plant is externally complete, and we believe that the plant is already in operation. The facility will probably produce more than enough for the Kahuta enrichment plants.

SECRET/NOFORN/ORCON

DECLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
REVIEWED by AmColster Date 2/7/91
FOI, EO or PA exemptions (b)(1)
() CLASSIFY as TS, AUTHORITY, OADR
() DOWNGRADE TO () S or () C, OADR
() Non-responsive info.

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET/NOFORN/OROCN

-2-

There are two major fuel cycle facilities located at the Chasma Barrage on the Indus River:

-- A fuel fabrication plant has appeared to be externally complete for the last four years and is probably the source of fuel for KANUPP.

-- At that location, the Pakistanis are also endeavoring to complete a 100 metric ton per year commercial reprocessing plant. This was initially to be provided by the French, but work is now continuing without extensive foreign assistance. Civil works are externally complete. Pakistan may have difficulty in outfitting the interior of the plant with process equipment and operating it at or near design capacity.

-- This is also the site where Pakistan intends to construct a light-water power reactor. Pakistan is now in the process of soliciting bids.

On the outskirts of Islamabad is the Pakistani Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology, commonly called PINSTECH, which is Pakistan's chief nuclear research center. Among other facilities located here are a small research reactor and facilities for small-scale reprocessing.

Pakistan's uranium enrichment plant is located at Kahuta also near Islamabad.

[] (b)(1)

SPENT FUEL REPROCESSING

We believe that facilities exist in the basement of the main building of PINSTECH in which would allow laboratory experiments with solvent extraction. A still larger, separately secured facility, the so-called New Laboratories (or New Labs for short), is nearing completion near the main building.

Technology obtained by Pakistan in Europe has provided the base for development of the New Labs. Construction of the New Labs began in about 1976, and it appears externally complete. However, we believe that it will be at least a year before it will be operational. In addition to European design assistance in the area of reprocessing, considerable reprocessing-related

SECRET/NOFORN/OROCN

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET/NOFORN/ORCON

-3-

equipment has been received by Pakistan from various suppliers (e.g., specialized equipment such as manipulators and a waste handling system).

A trilateral safeguards agreement (France, Pakistan, IAEA [INFCIRC/239]) should make any solvent extraction reprocessing in Pakistan subject to IAEA safeguards.

(b)(1)

Although externally complete, Pakistan is experiencing difficulties making New Labs operational. And even if it became operational in the next year or so and a decision were made to initiate reprocessing, Pakistan would not be able to separate enough plutonium for a single device for several years. The New Labs seem to be large enough, however, to allow for expansion of reprocessing capacity.

Spent fuel from KANUPP is the only source of suitable quantities of irradiated uranium to support a nuclear weapons program. To use this material, however, Pakistan would probably have to abrogate or violate Pakistan's safeguards

SECRET/NOFORN/ORCON

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET/NOFORN/ORCON

-4-

agreement with Canada and the IAEA. Pakistan, however, could "legally" initiate small-scale reprocessing at New Labs without violating safeguards or being required to submit the New Labs themselves to safeguards through the exemption clause of the the safeguards agreement with the IAEA covering the KANUPP fuel.

Pakistan's introducing indigenously produced fuel rods into KANUPP and the resultant inability of the IAEA to monitor the amount of fuel flowing through the reactor, as well as the IAEA's determination that other safeguards measures were inadequate over the last year and a half raised concerns regarding the possible diversion of spent fuel from the reactor to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. Although the safeguards situation has improved of late, further improvements must be agreed to. A diversion at some past time, however, cannot be completely ruled out.

URANIUM ENRICHMENT

In enrichment Pakistan is embarked on an effort to build a gas centrifuge facility capable of producing high enriched uranium. Development of a centrifuge enrichment capability in Pakistan was begun in earnest in 1975 and is now centered at Kahuta near Islamabad. The plant is eventually to house several thousand machines.

The program uses European technology (the designs for the machines were stolen by a Pakistani national) and has involved energetic procurement activities in various countries. The Engineering Research Laboratories (ERL), the organization responsible for Pakistan's unsafeguarded enrichment program, has long relied on an international network of procurement agents and front organizations to purchase the equipment for use in its gas centrifuge enrichment plant. The Pakistanis have been actively purchasing parts and equipment for their centrifuge program in these various countries, sometimes disguising their activities by providing false end-use statements information. Considerable outside assistance will likely continue to be required.

We believe that the Pakistanis have experienced difficulty in making there centrifuge machines work and that the Pakistanis have not yet produced any significant quantities of enriched uranium. Because of these operational problems, the Pakistanis in the recent past sought help from the Chinese. We do not know what the present status of that cooperation is.

Once the operational difficulties are overcome, and only part of the plant were put into sustained operation, it could produce sufficient fissile material for a single device within two to three years of start-up. When completely operational the plant could probably produce enough highly enriched uranium for several devices per year.

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET/NOFORN/ORCON

-5-

Despite claims that their enrichment effort is only a research and development program aimed at civil nuclear energy development (i.e., a planned light water reactor program, we believe the capacity of the production facility under construction at Kahuta is too large to be purely for research and development. At the same time we do not believe the capacity of it would meet the requirements for low enriched fuel for even one light water reactor.

We believe the ultimate application of the enriched uranium produced at Kahuta, which is unsafeguarded, is clearly nuclear weapons.

NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES

We believe that a nuclear weapons design program was started under Prime Minister Bhutto and that this program has continued.

We have information that nuclear explosive design and development work began in Pakistan soon after the 1974 Indian nuclear test. The work was given to an organization within the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission, which handled such topics as implosion hydrodynamics, neutronics, high explosives testing, and metallurgy, including packaging of high explosives. Subsequently, work was done on an electronic triggering circuit for nuclear device detonation, as well as experiments on conventional as well as shaped charges. This work complemented the acquisition of reprocessing and enrichment capability.

We believe that Pakistan has already undertaken a substantial amount of the necessary design and high explosives testing of the explosive triggering package for a nuclear explosive device and we believe Pakistan is now capable of producing a workable package of this kind. The nuclear explosive development program has attempted to purchase cameras and camera equipment specifically for nuclear-related explosives work.

SECRET/NOFORN/ORCON

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET/NOFORN/ORCON

-6-

More importantly, in addition to efforts to secure parts and equipment for the unsafeguarded reprocessing and enrichment efforts, Pakistan's procurement agents are also seeking from commercial companies items which are unambiguously identified as major components of a nuclear explosive device.

ERL is now involved in the acquisition and production of nuclear weapons components. In late 1981 through to 1982 procurement agents, who have long been associated with ERL, ordered from European companies metal components which from the design drawings provided the agents, have been unambiguously identified as those of a nuclear explosive device. Further specification in the drawings matched precisely the specifications for metal parts ordered by ERL's procurement agents. The Pakistanis are also seeking to acquire metal working equipment (precision lathes and associated equipment) intended specifically for the manufacture of these components.

In response to these developments, the United States approached the Pakistani government at the highest levels to communicate its extreme concern over these procurement activities. After the initial discussion with the Pakistanis, we noted a shift in emphasis from procurement of weapons components themselves to procurement of machinery necessary for their manufacture.

Nuclear Cooperation with China

We have concluded that China has provided assistance to Pakistan's program to develop a nuclear weapons capability. Over the past several years, China and Pakistan have maintained contacts in the nuclear field. For some time, China's involvement was limited to operational aspects of the KANUPP power reactor at Karachi. We now believe cooperation has taken place in the area of fissile material production and possibly also nuclear device design.

SECRET/NOFORN/ORCON

DECLASSIFIED